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Introduction
The  importance  of  comitology  continues  to  grow  as 
Community  legislation  increasingly  delegates  powers  to 
the European Commission. When the first comitology com-
mittees were created in the 1960s it was to deal with purely 
technical  implementing  measures,  mainly  in  the  domain 
of agriculture. Despite this exclusively technical delegation 
to the Commission, the Council insisted upon the creation 
of  comitology  committees  as  a  mechanism  of  oversight. 
Over time as the European project has expanded, both in 
depth and breadth, the need for comitology committees 
has increased such that they now form an essential part 
of the EU system. The majority of comitology activity con-
tinues to be found in the agricultural field, hence outside 
the scope of co decision and of the implications of this new 
RPS procedure. Should the Treaty of Lisbon come into force, 
and agriculture move into co decision, then almost 90% of 
delegation to comitology will occur via co decision. This in-
creased volume of delegation poses a significant number 
of questions, notably about the oversight of the Commis-
sion  by  the  co-legislators  before  adopting  implementing   
measures. Over time a series of attempts have been made to 
address the issues surrounding delegation, trying to balance   
transparency,  efficiency  and  accountability.  The  latest  of 
these  attempts  came  with  the  modification  of  the  1999 
Comitology Decision in 2006, which granted the European 
Parliament an important new power by adding the Regula-
tory Procedure with Scrutiny to the existing comitology pro-
cedures. This additional procedure, Article 5a of the modi-
fied  1999  Comitology  Decision,  was  an  explicit  response 
to a number of the Parliament’s claims concerning its in-
volvement in the delegation of powers to the Commission. 
Notably the new procedure grants the Parliament powers 
over  comitology  that  more  accurately  reflect  its  powers 
in  codecision,  effectively  increasing  democratic  control 
over  comitology  decisions. This  is  not  only  an  important 
symbolic and political gain for the Parliament; in practical 
terms this also substantially increases the power given to 
the Parliament, as it has gained a right of ‘ex post’ veto on 
implementing  measures  of  general  scope  that  amend  a 
legal act adopted under co decision. This right of veto goes 
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The European Parliament 
and Comitology: 
PRAC in Practice 
Alan Hardacre* and Mario Damen**
The history of comitology – the system of committees in charge of controlling the Commission’s 
implementing powers – has often been characterised by institutional tensions.1 The crux of these 
tensions is the role of the European Parliament (EP) and its quest to be granted powers equal to those 
of the Council. Over time these tensions have been resolved through a series of inter-institutional 
agreements and Comitology Decisions, essentially giving the Parliament incremental increases in 
power. The latest step, which came in 2006, was the modification of the Comitology Decision of 19992 
and the introduction of the new Regulatory Procedure with Scrutiny (RPS), also known in English 
by its French acronym – Procédure de Réglementation avec Contrôle (PRAC). This is unlikely to be 
the last word because it still fails to grant the Parliament an equal footing and because the Treaty 
of Lisbon promises more change. However, the new procedure has been in use for over two years 
and evaluating the early experiences of the European Parliament with RPS is now possible. This 
article offers a preliminary assessment of how the RPS is working in practise, highlighting the 
unforeseen developments that have arisen in the course of its implementation and answering 
some of the questions that were posed regarding the way the RPS would work in the Parliament. far beyond the previous powers of the Parliament and can 
be characterised as the third right that the Parliament has 
been granted in its quest for oversight of comitology.
  The first was the right of information (Article 7 of the 1999 
Comitology Decision) and the second the right of scrutiny,3 
which  includes the right to pass a non-binding resolution 
if the Parliament considers that the Commission has gone   
beyond  its  implementing  powers  (Article  8  of  the  1999 
Comitology Decision). 
  Given the ever-increasing importance of comitology in 
European Union decision-making, the question of demo-
cratic  legitimacy  has  become  very  important,  especially 
for the Parliament. From obscure beginnings in the field of   
agricultural markets in the 1960s, the comitology system 
has been expanded to cover an increasing number of policy 
areas, such that in 2007 there were 264 Committees and 
2,522  implementing 
measures.4  It  is  not 
simply  the  number 
of  committees,  and 
the vast output of the 
system,  however,  that 
are of importance but 
also  the  substance  of 
these  implementing 
measures  as  they  are 
no  longer  the  simple 
technical agricultural measures from the 1960s. The Commis-
sion itself recognises this fact when it states that “the sheer 
number of measures adopted as such gives no indication of the 
political, economic or financial importance of decisions taken”. 
5 For these very reasons, notably the inherent importance of 
the decisions taken, and given its co-legislative powers, the 
Parliament has been trying to increase its limited powers in 
this domain beyond those of being informed and the right 
to pass a non-binding resolution. Whilst the Parliament has 
been  very  welcoming  of  the  increasing  powers  of  infor-
mation,  most  recently  through  an  upgraded ‘Comitology 
Register’,6 it only used its right of scrutiny on six occasions 
between 1999 and 2005, thus highlighting the weakness 
of its real powers over implementing measures.7 The thrust 
of the new Article 5a procedure is to give the Parliament 
the power of veto in the area of so-called quasi-legislative 
measures – those measures that are considered to be of a 
near-legislative importance, but that remain non-essential 
and can therefore be delegated to the Commission. The aim 
was to create a situation where the process of comitology 
would be seen as being more democratic, in the sense that 
whenever the co-legislators give up legislative powers in the 
interest of greater flexibility, speed of decision-making and 
need for technical expertise, they do so in the knowledge 
that they retain a power of veto over what is being adopted 
by the Commission.
  When the new procedure came into force in 2006 it was 
expected that it would take a number of years before any 
form of evaluation could take place. It is, however, possible 
to draw a preliminary evaluation now since the RPS proce-
dure has already been used several times, although often 
in  somewhat  different  ways  to  those  originally  foreseen.
The RPS procedure on paper, despite the intention to sim-
plify and increase transparency and public understanding of 
comitology, is rather convoluted. The new procedure can be 
– and indeed, legally must be – used when three conditions 
are fulfilled: firstly that the act is a co decision act; secondly 
the measures are of general scope; and finally that only non-
essential elements are concerned. This exercise needs to be 
done on a case-by-case basis. Once the procedure has been 
included in secondary legislation the next stage is for the 
Commission to submit its draft implementing measure to 
the comitology committee, which should adopt an opinion. 
At this point there are two possible outcomes:
1.  In  the  case  of  a  positive  opinion8  of  the  comitology   
committee the Commission forwards the measure to both 
Council and Parliament who then have up to three months 
to oppose to the measure. If there is no opposition from ei-
ther party the Commission can adopt the measure after the 
three  month  period 
has lapsed. In the case 
of opposition “the Euro-
pean Parliament, acting 
by a majority of its com-
ponent  members,  or 
the Council, acting by a 
qualified majority, may 
oppose  the  adoption 
of the said draft by the 
Commission,  justifying 
their opposition by indicating that the draft measures proposed 
by the Commission exceed the implementing powers provided 
for in the basic instrument or that the draft is not compatible 
with the aim or the content of the basic instrument or does 
not respect the principles of subsidiarity or proportionality”.9 
If opposition, based on these three criteria, is found, then 
the Commission must either re-submit a draft measure to 
the committee or present a legislative proposal. The co-leg-
islators therefore have the same three criteria on which to 
base their opposition. It should be made clear that this does 
not grant them the right to oppose a draft measure because 
they are generally not satisfied with (a part of) its content, 
but they can only oppose on the basis of these criteria. It is 
also important to note that no provisions were put into the 
Decision to either allow for adoption of an implementing 
measure within the three month period, or to amend the 
content in case of opposition. Therefore if they agree they 
simply have to let the time period lapse or if either party 
opposes a single line in the implementing measure they 
have to oppose the entire measure.
2.  In the case of a negative opinion10 or the absence of an 
opinion on the part of the comitology committee, the Par-
liament does not maintain its status of equality with the 
Council. The measure goes first to the Council, which has 
three options: (a) It can oppose the measure in which case 
the Commission can modify the proposal and re-submit to 
the Council; (b) It envisages adoption, in which case it for-
wards the measure to the Parliament; (c) The Council takes 
no decision, in which case the Commission forwards the 
measure to the Parliament. If the measure is forwarded, the 
Parliament enjoys the same three criteria outlined above to 
make an objection.
14
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The sheer number of measures 
adopted as such gives no indication 
of the political, economic or 
financial importance 
of decisions taken15
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  When RPS was introduced in 2006 it raised a significant 
number of issues.11 In this contribution, we would like to 
concentrate on three questions which are addressed in the 
following section. Firstly, some observers from the Commis-
sion and Council feared that Parliament would be tempted 
to use the new power too often, thus frustrating the smooth 
implementation of legislation. Has this happened? Secondly, 
some commentators and practitioners would also like Parlia-
ment to have the power to explicitly approve draft measures, 
but this is currently not foreseen in the Comitology Decision. 
Others would even want to go further and give Parliament 
a real right of amendment on comitology draft measures, 
which is certainly not intended by the Comitology Decision. 
This raises the question of what possibilities Parliament does 
have when it intends to approve or amend a draft measure. 
Finally, fears were raised that Parliament would be lacking 
the necessary expertise to deal with technical draft mea- 
sures  and  would  rely  solely,  or  too  heavily,  on  lobbyists. 
So has this situation actually arisen and how has Parliament 
dealt with this aspect of comitology? 
PRAC in Practice in the European Parliament
1. How often does the European Parliament oppose 
an RPS draft measure?
One of the reasons why the Commission and Member States 
were never keen on giving a veto right to Parliament on im-
plementing measures, was their fear that Parliament would 
be tempted to (ab)use the new power too often, thus frus-
trating the smooth implementation of legislation. Although 
the veto right has now been given to the Parliament, it is 
still limited to the three criteria of exceeding implementing 
powers, not being in line with the aim or content of the 
basic  act,  or  not  re-
specting  subsidiarity 
or  proportionality.  If 
we look at the first ex-
periences with the RPS 
procedure,  nothing 
seems  to  indicate 
that  Parliament  will  abuse  its  power  and  frustrate  the 
implementation  of  legislation.  Interestingly  the  first 
use  of  the  RPS  veto  came  from  the  Council  in  July 
2008  when  it  objected12  to  six  draft  measures  that  had 
previously  been  agreed  by  the  comitology  committee. 
What is interesting about this case is that the objection was 
based on a horizontal issue that had no relation with the 
content of the individual draft measures, namely the desire 
by Member States not to use correlation tables.13 In the Par-
liament, up until March 2009, there has only been one case 
of a Resolution objecting to a draft measure that has been 
adopted. This  concerned  a  draft  measure  for  the  Capital 
Requirements Directive (CRD) that was opposed by the ple-
nary in December 2008, on the proposal of the parliamen-
tary committee for economic and monetary affairs (ECON).14 
It is no surprise that the ECON Committee should have been 
the first to veto a draft implementing measure, since this 
parliamentary committee has always been particularly ac-
tive in the oversight of draft implementing measures, and 
was at the basis of the reform of comitology. It is also inte-
resting to note which of the three criteria for objection were 
used in the two aforementioned cases. Both Council and 
Parliament argued that the Commission had exceeded its 
implementing powers. Council deemed that an obligation 
for correlation tables belongs in a basic act and not in a draft 
measure. In the CRD case, the draft measure amended cer-
tain annexes of the Capital Requirements Directive, whereas 
the Commission had shortly before presented a proposal to 
review the CRD directive itself. Parliament felt that it could 
not approve of a specific draft measure just before a more 
fundamental review under co decision. Apart from this, two 
more attempts were made to pass an objecting Resolution, 
but both failed in the vote in parliamentary committee. Both 
cases occurred in the parliamentary committee for environ-
mental affairs (ENVI). The first case was on the use of the bio-
cide ‘diffeneacoum’ and the second concerned eco-design of 
household lamps.
  Overall  practice  shows  that  Parliament  has  not  often 
objected to an RPS measure, which begs the question of 
why? We can think of at least four possible answers. A first 
answer could be that there have not been enough opportu-
nities to do so, as the RPS procedure has only very recently 
been introduced into legislation. A second answer could be 
that although opportunities were there, the Parliament as 
a whole is yet to fully grasp the potential of the RPS proce-
dure. Over time, increased experience might lead to a more 
frequent use of the RPS procedure, although this would not 
automatically lead to more objections. Thirdly it may be that 
the presented draft measures were simply not controversial 
and therefore not contested. Finally, as the above examples 
show, even if a draft Resolution for objection is presented, 
it will not necessarily be adopted. One should consider that 
a vote in a parliamentary committee is taken by simple ma-
jority of the Members 
present,  whereas  the 
vote in plenary on such 
objections is taken by 
the majority of Parlia-
ment’s  component 
Members  (absolute 
majority).  An  absolute  majority  in  plenary  should  never 
be taken for granted given that such sessions are rarely at-
tended by all MEPs. This can be seen as another ‘safety valve’ 
on the use of the RPS power by Parliament. When voting, 
a failure to obtain a majority means that not all Members 
supported the objection. This may be because they did not 
agree with the grounds for objection, but sometimes Mem-
bers may also withhold support because they do not want 
to get the blame for blocking a draft measure for only one 
particular aspect. In such cases, a right of amendment could 
have presented a different picture.
2. What alternatives does the Parliament have to opposing 
a draft measure?
The  RPS  procedure  is  meant  as  a  control  mechanism  for 
Parliament  after  an  implementing  measure  has  been  ap-
proved  (or  rejected)  by  a  comitology  committee.  Hence 
it is an ex-post veto possibility that should only be used if 
necessary. In reality, Parliament is very unlikely to want to 
In reality, Parliament is very unlikely 
to want to object to the vast 
majority of implementing measuresobject  to  the  vast  majority  of  implementing  measures. 
The normal procedure in these cases is simply to do nothing 
and let the time go by until the deadline lapses, at which point 
the Commission can adopt the draft measure. Where meas-
ures  are  not  controver-
sial, and not initially con-
tested by the Parliament, 
the  Commission  has 
sometimes  expressed 
the desire that Parliament approves the draft measure con-
cerned without waiting the full three months. It should be 
noted that the RPS procedure, and Rule 81 of the Parliament’s 
Rules of Procedure,15 foresee no explicit legal possibility for 
such an approval. Nevertheless, nothing would appear to 
prevent Parliament from approving a draft measure, a prac-
tise which the Council has already adopted on a regular and   
almost systematic basis. In a few cases the Commission has 
explicitly asked the parliamentary committee concerned to 
approve a draft measure before the three month deadline. 
Until now it has been up to the parliamentary committee 
concerned to decide how to deal with such a request, but 
it is not unlikely that the Parliament could create some hori-
zontal rules on this in the future if Commission demands 
continue. In some cases committees have indicated that at 
a given stage no objection had been made, which could be 
read as an informal approval, but can only be legally formal 
once the deadline has lapsed, given that Members have the 
right to object until the deadline passes. So, thus far, it has 
been up to the Commission services to decide whether they 
take the risk of adopting the draft measure before the dead-
line.
  There is, however, another interesting practice that seems 
to be developing and is not visible in the adopted acts of 
Parliament, but which may indicate how Parliament will use 
its powers under the RPS procedure. In two cases parliamen-
tary  committees  drafted  objecting  Resolutions  that  were 
withdrawn even before the vote in the parliamentary com-
mittee, after the Commission indicated that the modifica-
tions  required  by  Parlia-
ment would be taken into 
account in a subsequent 
revision  of  the  imple-
menting measures. These 
cases occurred in the par-
liamentary  committees 
for environmental affairs 
(on  the  use  of  animal 
testing) and for transport 
and tourism (on the use 
of  seatbelts  for  children 
in aeroplanes). The inten-
tions of the Commission 
were  made  in  letters  to 
the  parliamentary  com-
mittee  concerned,  after 
which the draft Resolution was removed from the agenda. 
This practice is particularly interesting, as it means the threat 
of a veto can lead to specific modifications, albeit in a fu-
ture revision of the draft measure. In this way Parliament 
has a sort of ‘de facto right of amendment’, or a soft right of 
amendment. On the other hand, the concrete effect of this 
practice is yet to be evaluated, as Parliament runs the risk that 
promises from the Commission are not kept and may even 
be forgotten if the time between revisions of implementing 
measures is relatively 
long,  or  new  Com-
missioners  or  new 
Members  of  Parlia-
ment  are  in  charge. 
In such cases it may be up to the Parliament 
Secretariat to play the role of institutional memory.
3. Who influences Parliament’s decision to oppose 
a draft measure?
Given that comitology is such a specialised and technical 
domain,  and  that  the  Parliament  (and  thus  MEPs)  lacks 
technical  resources,  it  was  originally  feared  that  the 
introduction  of  the  RPS  procedure  would  open  the  door 
to  intensive  lobbying  of  comitology  measures  through 
the  EP.  Many  practitioners  and  external  commentators 
questioned whether the Parliament would simply have to 
rely on external sources of information, such as lobbyists, to 
generate its positions on implementing measures. The way 
the Parliament has built its internal structures to deal with 
RPS has resulted in the committee secretariats becoming 
the most important in-house filters and sources of expertise. 
Committee  secretariats,  however,  mainly  have  a  role  of 
facilitation and transfer of information, not a direct role in 
influencing Members’  decisions to oppose a draft measure, 
which  would  not  suit  their  politically  neutral  position. 
The  secretariat  can  play  a  role  in  providing  Members 
with  expertise,  but  it  cannot  be  expected  that  these 
experts gain significant in-depth knowledge of the vast range 
of issues dealt with in draft measures. Expertise may be based 
on (scientific) external research, but here it should be noted 
that a three-month deadline does not allow for extensive   
in-depth  external  research.  Given  these  constraints 
on  the  role  of  secretariats  and  external  research,  it   
becomes clear why fears 
were raised about MEPs 
relying  too  heavily  on 
lobbyists  when  taking 
their decisions to object 
to a particular measure. 
The  role  of  lobbyists  in 
Brussels-based decision-
making  is  subject  to 
extensive  research  and 
analysis, although mostly 
in the realm of legislation, 
not  implementing 
measures.  For  our 
analysis of the lobbying 
of comitology we would 
like to concentrate on one 
particular aspect. Lobby organisations normally try to ‘sell’ 
their point of view not only to the European Parliament, but 
to all other political actors involved in the decision-making 
process. This means that the same lobbyists have normally 
already been talking to the experts of national governments 
16
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The RPS procedure is evolving in 
quite some unforeseen ways
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represented  in  the  comitology  committees  and  to  the 
Commission officials drafting the implementing measures, 
before they come to knock on the door of Parliament. In fact, 
all actors can be influenced by lobbyists and it is their own 
decision to decide to what extent they take on board the 
views of lobbyists. This very phenomenon can be illustrated 
by an example from the transport committee of Parliament 
when it discussed a draft measure on the use of so-called 
‘loop belts’ for children in airplanes. Although safety tests 
conducted in the 1990s had shown the potential danger of 
these belts to children’s health, the competent comitology 
committee had never amended the applicable rules. When 
this issue was discussed in the Parliamentary committee it 
was suspected that no amendment had been made due to 
pressure from the airlines on the Council and Commission, 
because they did not want to spend money on extra seats 
for children, and rather preferring them to sit on an adult’s 
lap  even  if  this  situation  was  potentially  dangerous. This 
short example highlights the fact that lobbying in the realm 
of implementing measures is not limited to the Parliament, 
and early experiences with the RPS procedure suggest that 
there has been no significant increase in lobbying of the 
Parliament  as  originally  feared. The  Parliament  has  been 
soliciting more input from technical experts, but there has 
been no deluge of lobbying on comitology issues. 
  Members of Parliament are politicians and they will judge 
draft measures from a political perspective. This perspective 
may be influenced by suggestions from lobbyists, journa-
lists, experts, scientists or any particular group of people. 
Members of Parliament will, however, always look at how the 
particular issue may fit with their personal views, the views 
of their political party or of the voters they represent, or from 
the point of view of the parliamentary committee of which 
they are a Member as far as there is a feeling of consensus 
there. Seen in this light it is no wonder that Members of 
Green political parties express themselves on environmental 
issues as much in comitology as they do in co decision. Mem-
bers of the parliamentary committee on civil liberties and 
justice (LIBE) were at the origin of another case that high-
lights a further unforeseen aspect of the RPS procedure. This 
is the case of the rejection of ‘body scanners’ 16 as a device 
to screen passengers at airports. The use of body scanners 
was one small part of 
a  draft  measure  on 
aviation security. This 
draft  measure  was, 
according  to  Rule 
81  of  Parliament’s 
rules  of  procedure, 
referred to the trans-
port  committee.  In 
the meantime, how-
ever, Members of the 
LIBE committee got hold of the issue and presented to the 
plenary a ‘normal’ parliamentary Resolution under Rule 108, 
criticising the use of body scanners, which was adopted. This 
kind of Resolution has no legally binding effect on the Com-
mission, whereas a Rule 81 Resolution does. Yet, as the issue 
had raised significant media reaction and hence political 
responses in several Member States, the responsible Com-
missioner withdrew the draft measure. In this way we have a 
second case of a withdrawn draft measure, but this time not 
on the basis of the formal RPS procedure. What this example 
shows in particular, is that this decision was not based on 
the influence of a secretariat, lobbyist, or other group, but on 
the sensitivity of Members involved in civil liberties matters 
concerning those liberties and privacy issues. This highlights 
the fact that lobbyists, or the secretariat, can bring matters 
to the attention of a Member of Parliament, but at the end 
of the day it is the Member’s political choice whether to pro-
ceed with an objection.
Conclusions: Theory and Practise of PRAC 
The three preceding sections demonstrate that the RPS pro-
cedure is evolving in quite some unforeseen ways, allowing 
some preliminary conclusions to be drawn on the differences 
between the theory and practise of this new comitology 
procedure. Even after only two years of experience with RPS 
a number of patterns have developed in the negotiation and 
use of the procedure – patterns that can be expected to con-
tinue. For this reason, and also because the new comitology 
provisions which would be introduced by the Lisbon Treaty 
are very similar to the current RPS provisions, the findings in 
this article are of particular practical importance for the fu-
ture practice of comitology. This preliminary evaluation has 
not only answered a series of questions that the new proce-
dure has raised since 2006, but also highlighted a number of 
unexpected developments about how the new procedure is 
working in practice.
  In terms of usage of the new procedure, we noted the 
surprising fact that the Council was first to use its veto, and 
not the Parliament. The Parliament has been moderate in 
the number of objections it has tried to raise, although it is 
not clear to what extent this is due to the fact that the vast 
majority of RPS measures are still to come in the future; to 
Members not yet being familiar enough with the new proce-
dure and its full potential; to the non-controversial nature of 
the draft measures; or because it is not easy to find a voting 
majority for resolutions. Summing up on how often Parlia-
ment opposes an RPS draft measure, we can conclude that 
the Council once rejected a set of six draft measures and that 
Parliament once rejected 
one draft measure.17 Fur-
thermore,  Parliament 
started  four  more  pro-
cedures  to  object,  two 
of  which  were  voted 
down in the parliamen-
tary  committee  con-
cerned, and two others 
were  withdrawn  before 
the vote after promises 
made by the Commission. Looking at which of the three cri-
teria for rejection were used by Parliament, we noted that 
the only Rule 81 resolution adopted on proposal of the ECON 
committee alleged that the Commission had exceeded its 
implementing powers. Different criteria were used for the 
other cases. In the case of household lamps the measure 
was considered disproportionate, as it would lead to a ban 
17
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Early experiences with the RPS 
procedure suggest that there 
has been no significant increase 
in lobbying of the Parliament as 
originally fearedon a product, a measure it was deemed more appropriate to 
decide under co-decision. In the three other cases (biocide 
‘diffeneacoum’, children’s seatbelts and animal testing) the 
draft measures were thought to be not compatible with the 
aim or content of the basic acts, the main purpose of which 
was the promotion of safety, life and/or the environment. It 
is in this area of attempting to oppose a draft implementing 
measure  that  a  series  of  unexpected  developments  have 
arisen. The most interesting of these, certainly for the future, 
is the notion of the Parliament being able to threaten an 
RPS Resolution to extract a de facto right of amendment –   
although we are yet to see if the promises made through this 
development are actually kept. Finally, we also noted that 
the European Parliament has not become, as initially feared, 
a Trojan horse for lobbying interests and that the pattern of 
lobbying of implementing measures has changed little in 
the last couple of years.
  Given  the  increasing  insertion  of  RPS  into  legislation, 
a full understanding – by all actors – of how they can use the 
procedure and how it works in reality will be essential. In this 
sense there is a form of information advantage for those who 
grasp the full consequences, intended and other, of how the 
RPS is working in reality. It is hoped that this article has pro-
vided a first insight into what may become a more and more 
researched and lobbied area of EU decision-making.
18
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